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STATEMENT OF IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF  
AMICI CURIAE 
 
The statement of identity and interest of amici are set forth in the 
Motion for Leave to File that accompanies this brief. 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court has recognized the need to improve the Batson 
framework and has taken steps to better enable the Batson test to root out 
discrimination in jury selection, most recently by adopting the objective 
observer standard in State v. Jefferson, 192 Wn.2d 226, 249, 429 P.3d 467 
(2018). An objective observer, for purposes of determining whether race 
could have been a factor in the exercise of a peremptory strike, is one who 
is knowledgeable about the existence and extent of explicit and implicit 
bias as well as how these biases have contributed to racial 
disproportionality in the criminal justice system. 
The objective observer is aware that race can affect perception and 
behavior in stark ways, as exemplified in an episode of ABC’s hidden 
camera show, What Would You Do?, which captured people’s candid 
reactions to actors trying to steal a bike in a public park.1 Three similarly 
dressed actors, a white man, a black man, and a white woman, individually 
                                                          
1 At least one federal judge shows this to jurors to educate them about implicit bias. Jerry 
Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1182 n.250 (2012). 
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made obvious attempts to steal the bike in broad daylight as people passed 
by.2 For the most part, the white man was left alone; the black man was 
repeatedly confronted and challenged; the white woman was either left 
alone or was assisted in stealing the bike.3 Though later interviews of 
those observing the three actors typically included claims that race was 
irrelevant to their decisions to act or not act, an objective observer could 
conclude that race was a factor that shaped their perceptions and behavior. 
 In the present case, as detailed below, one prospective juror’s 
pauses were perceived as thoughtful; another prospective juror’s pauses 
caused concern. The first, Juror 4,4 was likely white; the second, Juror 6, 
African American. The first juror was struck for cause, though not because 
of the pauses. The second juror’s pauses were offered as a reason to justify 
a peremptory strike. Additional reasons offered against the second juror 
were her familial connection to the criminal justice system and her 
feelings about her brother being assaulted by police. Reasons such as these 
disproportionately impact minority jurors because, as detailed infra Part II, 
minorities are more likely to have connections to the criminal justice 
                                                          
2 What Would You Do? (ABC television broadcast May 7, 2010), https://www.youtube. 
com/watch?v=ge7i60GuNRg. 
3 If the actor was confronted, at the close of the particular interaction, the scene was reset 
to test new individuals and groups with the setting. Id. 
4 Juror numbers refer to their respective numbers in the venire. 
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system and are more likely to have negative views of the system. An 
objective observer, aware of explicit and implicit bias and the historical 
and contemporary experience of racial minorities in the United States and 
in Washington, could view race as a factor in the exercise of the 
peremptory strike. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Objective Observer Recognizes and Seeks to Address 
the Existence and Impact of Implicit Bias and to Overcome 
the Difficulties in Uncovering Covert Conscious Bias in 
Jury Selection. 
 
A legal standard that requires a showing of purposeful 
discrimination cannot redress disparate outcomes that result from implicit 
or unconscious biases. That same purposeful discrimination standard does 
not provide an effective way to identify and redress covert conscious bias. 
This Court recognized as much in State v. Saintcalle, 178 Wn.2d 34, 45, 
309 P.3d 326 (2013) (even after Batson, “peremptory challenges have 
become a cloak for race discrimination” (citing Equal Justice Initiative, 
Illegal Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection: A Continuing Legacy 
(Aug. 2010))). 
After Saintcalle, this Court has taken meaningful steps to 
ameliorate the harms caused by the deficiencies of Batson. In City of 
Seattle v. Erickson, this Court adopted a bright-line rule for the first step, 
holding that the peremptory strike of a juror who is the sole member of a 
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racially cognizable group constitutes a prima facie showing of racial 
discrimination. 188 Wn.2d 721, 734, 398 P.3d 1124 (2017). In Jefferson, 
this Court addressed the third step and changed the “purposeful 
discrimination” inquiry to “whether an objective observer could view race 
or ethnicity as a factor in this use of the peremptory strike.” 192 Wn.2d at 
249-50. The objective observer knows that racial discrimination has a long 
and pernicious history, both nationally and locally, and implicit bias is part 
of the problem. Id. In this case, an objective observer, equipped with this 
knowledge, would be well aware that bias can be masked by subtle 
reasons based on juror conduct and demeanor, “which are easily alleged 
but often extremely difficult to scrutinize.” Saintcalle, 178 Wn.2d at 93 
(González, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted). 
A. An Objective Observer Could See Race as a Factor in the 
Strike Because Juror 6’s Pauses Were Treated Differently 
from the Pauses of Other Jurors. 
  
The State relied in part on two pauses by Juror 6 to support its 
peremptory challenge. RP 1017, 1018. The first pause referenced by the 
State occurred on the first day of voir dire, RP 497; the second, occurred 
on the third day, RP 881. Though there was a colloquy with Juror 6 over 
the first pause, there was not over the second. The second preceded her 
affirmation where she stated, “I am very hesitant about making a decision 
that would weigh that heavily upon somebody’s life, but I feel that I am 
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capable of making a fair and impartial decision.” RP 878:7-10. As detailed 
below, these pauses are imperfectly reflected in the record, inaccurately 
remembered, difficult to scrutinize, and disparately treated.  
The first pause is reflected by the prosecutor confronting hesitation 
by Juror 6, manifested in the record by the word “Um.” RP 497:1-3. Much 
like the suspicion the black actor was subjected to in the episode of What 
Would You Do?, the increased suspicion Juror 6 was subjected to is 
discernable by how the prosecutor pressed Juror 6. After asking and 
ascertaining that Juror 6 agreed that defendants deserve a fair trial and that 
jurors are to treat them “fairly and make sure that they have a fair trial,” 
the prosecutor asked if she agrees that “prosecutors should have a fair trial 
as well.” RP 496:6-497:2. 
A. Um, yes. 
Q. You seem to have hesitated. And again, I don't know if 
it comes out in the typing, but you paused, and your 
voice kind of reflected some hesitation. Why? 
A. I guess -- I guess it's fair both ways. I mean, it's the 
responsibility of each side to present their case, so I 
think that -- I think it's -- I think each side deserves 
fairness. 
Q. I don't mean to pick on you. I just want to ask you, why 
did you pause when I asked you that question?  
A. I guess sometimes -- I think that maybe sometimes when 
-- when people are, like, of certain groups sometimes 
may not get necessarily as fair trials as others 
sometimes. So I guess that's where my hesitation was 
coming from. 
Q. Is that the experience you had with your brother? 
A. No, not necessarily. I think just in general, like just kind 
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of a culture of -- like Black Lives Matter and some of 
the racial tensions that are kind of being brought to light 
is kind of the reality of a lot of people sometimes. 
Q. Absolutely. Well, do you feel -- I will just put it on you. 
Do you feel like you would be able to give us a fair trial 
in this case? 
A. I think I would. 
 
RP 497:3-498:3 (Mr. Yip questioning, Juror 6 answering, no pause in 
Juror 6’s last response).  
The second pause that occurred two days later is reflected by em-
dashes offsetting the words “-- I don’t --.” RP 881:19-22. Though there 
was a colloquy between the prosecutor and the juror regarding the first 
pause, the second pause was not contemporaneously corroborated in the 
record by the judge or the other parties. Also, the context necessary to 
properly evaluate both pauses, such as duration, tone of voice, and 
demeanor is entirely absent.  
 Even without this lack of context, the record makes it clear that 
Juror 6’s pauses were treated differently than the pauses of other jurors. 
For example, Juror 4 paused multiple times just prior to Juror 6’s “Um” 
pause. Yet Juror 4’s pauses were seen by the prosecutor to be evidence of 
thoughtfulness while Juror 6’s pauses were viewed with suspicion. 




Pauses by Juror 45 “Um” Pause by Juror 66 
Though race and ethnicity was not 
specified, by inference, likely 
white7 
African American8 
Not questioned by the prosecution  Questioned by the prosecution and 
twice asked about why she paused  
Expressed hesitation and concern 
as to the felony murder rule 
Expressed hesitation and concern 
as to whether all people always 
receive fair trials, citing Black 
Lives Matter as an example 
Prosecution viewed the juror’s 
pauses as evidence of 
thoughtfulness 
Prosecution viewed the juror’s 
pause with suspicion 
Prosecution noted the pause for 
the record and asked the Judge for 
an independent assessment of the 
juror’s demeanor  
Prosecution noted the pause for 
the record by confronting Juror 6 
without asking the Judge for an 
independent assessment of the 
juror’s demeanor 
 
There are additional disparities in the treatment of Juror 6 that 
could cause an objective observer to conclude that race or ethnicity was a 
factor. One such disparity is that the prosecutor appears to have 
misremembered when the “Um” pause occurred. The prosecutor 
                                                          
5 RP 480-485 (pausing at least four times as indicated by em-dashes). 
6 RP 496-498 (pause as indicated by the use of the term “Um”). 
7 The inference is supported by the fact that the defense argued that the for cause 
challenges asserted against both Juror 4 and Juror 6 should be denied, but only raised the 
potential for a Batson challenge and specified the race for Juror 6. Compare RP 485-488, 
with RP 854:20-855:7. 
8 RP 1015:22. 
8 
 
represented that Juror 6 paused when she was asked whether she would be 
fair, RP 1018:20-23, yet the “Um” pause actually occurred earlier when 
she was asked the abstract question of whether the State should have a fair 
trial generally. RP 497:1-3. The echoes of this potential memory lapse 
appear to extend even to the prosecution’s most recent supplemental brief. 
Supplemental Br. of Pet’r/Cross Resp’t at 13 (State’s brief) (citing one of 
the reasons proffered by the State for the peremptory challenge as “she 
‘paused for a very long time’ before being able to answer that she could 
give the State a fair trial” without noting the discrepancy between the 
record and the reason offered). When Juror 6 was ultimately asked about 
whether she would be fair, she said “I think I would,” with no evidence in 
the record of a pause. RP 497:24-498:2. 
Further, Juror 6 was the only juror that the prosecution confronted 
about a pause, see RP 497:1-5, and no other juror was asked the abstract 
question of whether the State “should have a fair trial,” the question that 
sparked the pause.9 A juror being asked “different and more” questions is 
relevant to the determination as to whether an objective observer could 
view race or ethnicity as a factor. See Jefferson, 192 Wn.2d at 234-35.  
                                                          
9 Compare RP 496:17-497:3, with RP 553:15-554:24, 662:8-20, 770:7-775:11, 785:24-
786:14, 837:12-17, 922:23-923:3, 979:25-981:5 (questioning of jurors by prosecutor 
relating to whether a juror could be fair).  
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A white juror, whose pause is attributed to his concern about the 
felony murder doctrine, is considered thoughtful by the prosecutor and by 
the judge; a black juror, who explains that she paused because of her 
concern that certain groups are not always treated fairly in the criminal 
justice system, is regarded with suspicion. 
 Ultimately, this Court does not need to conclude that an objective 
observer could conclude that race was the reason for the peremptory 
challenge, as is suggested by the State in its supplemental briefing. See 
Supplemental Br. of Pet’r/Cross-Resp’t at 16.10 Instead, as stated in 
Jefferson, the question is “whether an objective observer could view race 
or ethnicity as a factor in the use of the peremptory strike.” Jefferson, 192 
Wn.2d at 230 (emphasis added). Given that Juror 6’s pauses were treated 
differently than those of other jurors, the assertion of the pauses to support 
the peremptory challenge is sufficient evidence that an objective observer 
could view Juror 6’s race or ethnicity as a factor in the use of the 
peremptory strike against her. 
 
                                                          
10 Though the State initially provides the correct rule statement from Jefferson, that the 
objective observer need only conclude that race or ethnicity could have been a factor, 
Supplemental Br. of Pet’r/Cross-Resp’t at 10, it distorts the rule when it states that “[n]o 
objective observer could view Juror 6’s race as the reason for the State’s challenge,” id. 
at 11 (emphasis added), and that “the totality of the circumstances could not lead an 
objective observer to conclude that the peremptory challenge to Juror 6 was because of 
her race,” id. at 16 (emphasis added).  
10 
 
B. Reasons Based on Juror Conduct that Are Not Supported 
by the Record Should Receive Greater Scrutiny. 
 
 In addition to adopting the objective observer standard, Jefferson 
adopted de novo review for Batson challenges. 192 Wn.2d at 249. Under a 
de novo review, an objective observer could conclude that race was a 
factor if a reason given for a peremptory challenge is not well supported 
by the record. Cf. id. at 251 (“Without a more specific record about why 
the prosecutor did not ‘bond’ with a juror, this vague assertion cannot 
serve as a valid, race-neutral justification for a peremptory strike.”). 
Reasons based on juror conduct should be supported by evidence 
beyond a mere assertion by one party that the conduct occurred. Even 
prior to Jefferson, reasons offered to support a peremptory challenge were 
viewed with increased scrutiny if they lacked support in the record. Cf. Ali 
v. Hickman, 571 F.3d 902, 910 (9th Cir. 2009) (reasoning that, under 
Batson, a reason proffered for a peremptory challenge was pretextual, in 
part, because it was unsupported by the record). If a reason offered is not 
supported by the record, an objective observer could find that race was a 
factor in the peremptory challenge if the juror received differential 
treatment. See Jefferson, 192 Wn.2d at 250-51 (noting that, under the 
objective observer standard, the proffered reasons for a strike “seem[ed] to 
lack support in the record” and reflected differential treatment, thus the 
11 
 
reasons offered could support an inference of implicit bias). 
 While GR 37 is not applicable to this case, its treatment of reasons 
based on juror conduct and demeanor is instructive. A “pause” is not 
explicitly provided for in subsection (i), but it is similar to the giving of an 
“unintelligent or confused answer.” GR 37(i). If there is no corroboration 
of the conduct in the record “by the judge or opposing counsel verifying 
the behavior,” the reason is invalidated. Id. 
Without a rule that requires independent corroboration, reasons 
based on juror conduct and demeanor could be used by individuals 
seeking to intentionally discriminate in jury selection, effectively masking 
their true intentions.11 If such unsupported reasons are allowed to pass the 
scrutiny of an objective observer, those seeking to intentionally 
discriminate on the basis of race will have at their disposal a tool well-
suited to covertly discriminate in jury selection. Even in the case of 
unconscious and implicit bias, allowing such reasons to stand without 
independent corroboration allows individuals to rationalize decisions 
reached on the basis of unconscious and implicit biases without giving 
                                                          
11 Amici are not suggesting that this is what occurred in this case. However, as was 
required prior to Jefferson, requiring a finding that reasons offered were pretextual 
required a court to find, essentially, that the striking party acted in a racist manner, 
precisely as the prosecutor hinted, “I appreciate the fact that Mr. McGuire has phrased . . 
. [the Batson challenge] the way he has and not blatantly called me a racist, but still, I 
mean, that’s really what it comes down to.” RP 1015:17-20. 
12 
 
courts the ability to scrutinize the rationale to uncover hidden bias. De 
novo review based on a properly informed objective observer provides an 
important and needed remedy. 
II. The Objective Observer Is Aware that Discrimination Has 
Led Some Individuals to Have a Disproportionate 
Connection with the Criminal Justice System, Which Is 
then Offered as a Race-Neutral Reason to Justify 
Peremptory Strikes. 
  
An objective observer, for purposes of determining whether race 
could have been a factor in the exercise of a peremptory strike, is one who 
is knowledgeable about the existence and extent of explicit and implicit 
bias. See Jefferson, 192 Wn.2d at 249-50 (“objective inquiry based on the 
average reasonable person – defined here as a person who is aware of the 
history of explicit race discrimination in America and aware of how that 
impacts our current decision making in nonexplicit, or implicit, unstated 
ways”).  
This Court has taken “judicial notice of implicit and overt racial 
bias against black defendants in this state,” referring specifically to this 
state’s “case law and history of racial discrimination.” State v. Gregory, 
192 Wn.2d 1, 22, 427 P.3d 621 (2018). The following case law and 
history, recited by the Gregory Court, included not just the treatment of 
black defendants, but also black members of the jury venire and witnesses, 




City of Seattle v. Erickson, 188 
Wn.2d 721, 734, 398 P.3d 1124 
(2017)  
(peremptory challenge used to 
strike the only African-American 
on a jury panel) 
State v. Walker, 182 Wn.2d 463, 
488, 341 P.3d 976 (2015) (Gordon 
McCloud, J., concurring)  
(describing prosecutor's use of 
inflammatory, racially charged 
images “highlighting the 
defendant's race—his blackness—
in a case where that had absolutely 
no relevance”) 
In re Pers. Restraint of 
Gentry, 179 Wn.2d 614, 632, 316 
P.3d 1020 (2014)  
 (prosecutor heckled black defense 
attorney in a death-penalty trial, 
asking, “‘Where did you learn 
your ethics? In Harlem?’”) 
State v. Saintcalle, 178 Wn.2d 34, 
45, 309 P.3d 326 (2013) (plurality 
opinion) (second alteration in 
original) (quoting TASK FORCE ON 
RACE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYS., 
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON RACE 
AND WASHINGTON’S CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (2011) . . . 
[https://perma.cc/6BV4-RBB8]) 
(“‘[T]he fact of racial and ethnic 
disproportionality in 
[Washington's] criminal justice 
system is indisputable.’”)  
State v. Monday, 171 Wn.2d 667, 
676-79, 257 P.3d 551 (2011)  
(reversing a case in which the 
prosecutor argued to the jury that 
“‘black folk don't testify against 
black folk’” and referred to the 
police as “‘po-leese’” in the 
examination of black witness) 
State v. Rhone, 168 Wn.2d 645, 
648, 229 P.3d 752 (2010) (plurality 
opinion)  
 (peremptory challenge used to 
strike the “only African-American 
venire member in a trial of an 
African-American defendant”) 
State v. Dhaliwal, 150 Wn.2d 559, 
582, 79 P.3d 432 
(2003) (Chambers, J., concurring)  
(the prosecution's theory of the 
case relied on “impermissible 




Turner v. Stime, 153 Wn. App. 
581, 594, 222 P.3d 1243 (2009)  
(requiring new trial based on 
jurors' racist remarks regarding 
Japanese American attorney) 
OFFICE OF ATTY. GEN. OF WASH. 
STATE, CONSOLIDATING TRAFFIC-
BASED FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS IN 
WASHINGTON STATE 9 (Dec. 1, 
2017) . . . [https://perma.cc/TB4K-
KAEF] 
[no parenthetical supplied but 
report concludes “that minority 
racial and ethnic groups remain 
disproportionately represented in 
Washington’s court and criminal 
justice system.”] 
Amici Curiae Br. of 56 Former & 
Retired Wash. State Judges et al. at 
8-13, State v. Gregory, 192 Wn.2d 
1, 427 P.3d 621 (2018) 
[no parenthetical supplied but 
referenced pages review 
Washington case law and various 
reports discussing racial bias in 
various aspects of the criminal 
justice system, including racial 
bias in jury selection] 
 
Id. at 22-23. 
With this knowledge, an objective observer will be aware that 
certain race-neutral reasons offered to justify peremptory challenges have 
historically been associated with improper discrimination in jury 
selection.12  
In the present case, Juror 6 was questioned extensively about her 
familial link to the criminal justice system, to suggest that such a 
connection negatively affected her impartiality. The questioning began 
                                                          
12 Though GR 37 is not applicable here, the Court recognized in GR 37 that certain 
reasons for strikes are presumptively invalid “[b]ecause historically the following reasons 
for peremptory challenges have been associated with improper discrimination in jury 
selection in Washington State.” GR 37(h).  
15 
 
with uncovering details about a specific bad experience with law 
enforcement but eventually covered Juror 6’s views on the fairness of law 
enforcement in general: 
Q: Juror Number 6, bad experience? 
A: Yeah. I had a brother who was assaulted by the police and sued 
the police.  
Q: I think they can’t hear you. 
A: and he had a lawsuit, sued them, won because of the assault 
when we were younger. 
Q: Does that, I guess, shape your view of police in general as a 
whole? 
A: Not -- no, not necessarily. 
. . .  
Q: Did it leave any - - any bad taste in your mouth, I guess, that 
whole experience and having that happen to your brother? 
A: Yeah. It was unsettling. It still is. But it happens. 
 
RP 659:19-660:19 (Mr. Yip questioning, Juror 6 answering).  
Q: Did you feel that your family member was treated fairly by the 
system? And let me break that down. Do you feel he was treated 
fairly by the police? 
 A: No. 
Q: And if you feel comfortable, how do you feel he wasn’t treated 
fairly? 
A: He was assaulted by the police. But he’s had various cases and 
issues, and there have been varying degrees of fairness or - -  
. . .  
A: And there’s been varying degrees of fair treatment.  
 . . .  
RP 712:22-713:12 (Mr. Doyle questioning, Juror 6 answering). 
 
In addition to being aware of the historical discrimination against 
minority jurors, an objective observer will also be aware that using 
peremptory challenges to strike potential jurors because of their 
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ambivalence, skepticism, or even distrust towards law enforcement 
officers or the criminal justice system broadly, has had the discriminatory 
impact of removing a disproportionate number of minorities from jury 
panels.  
As a result of the systemic inequalities in our criminal justice 
system, black individuals are subject to disproportionate rates for arrests, 
convictions, and sentencing lengths. See generally MICHELLE 
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 180 (2012) (“More African American 
adults are under correctional control today – in prison or jail, on probation 
or parole – than were enslaved in 1850, a decade before the Civil War 
began.”).  
This observation also holds true in Washington State. See 
generally Task Force on Race & Criminal Justice Sys., Preliminary Report 
on Race and Washington's Criminal Justice System (2011).13 As 
incarceration levels have risen in the black community, so have the rates 
of “other African Americans who are connected through filial and social 
networks.” Melynda J. Price, Performing Discretion or Performing 
Discrimination: Race, Ritual, and Peremptory Challenges in Capital Jury 
                                                          
13 https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/sulr/vol35/iss3/3/, reprinted in 47 GONZ. L. 
REV. 251 (2011), 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 623 (2012), 87 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2012) 
(published by flagship law reviews of all three law schools in Washington State). 
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Selection, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 57, 90 (2009). The objective observer 
will be aware of this and could consider race to have been a factor in the 
exercise of a peremptory strike against Juror 6. 
Finally, it would be contradictory to allow a peremptory strike to 
be used against a prospective juror who expresses concerns because they 
are aware of the history and existence of racial disparities in the criminal 
justice system, when that is the very knowledge the objective observer is 
expected to bring to this inquiry. Cf. Jefferson, 192 Wn.2d at 249-50. 
Allowing a link to the criminal justice system to be a valid race-neutral 
reason for a peremptory challenge will transform the Batson hearing into a 
mere ritual that “perpetuates a veneer of racial inclusion that is 
substantively false.” Price, supra, at 61. Broadly using a link to the 
criminal justice system as a race-neutral reason to justify a peremptory 
challenge should be rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
 The adoption of the objective observer standard in State v. 
Jefferson cemented this Court’s efforts to recognize the role that implicit 
bias plays in jury selection. Under this standard, an objective observer 
could view the bases for peremptory challenges that have been historically 
associated with improper discrimination in jury selection as invalid due to 
the disparate impact on potential minority jurors. Using personal, filial, or 
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social connections to the justice system or a distrust of law enforcement 
officers to justify a peremptory strike could be viewed by an objective 
observer as using race or ethnicity as a factor in the use of the peremptory 
challenge. Similarly, an objective observer could reach the same 
conclusion when juror conduct and demeanor is used without support in 
the record or was the subject of disparate treatment. The objective 
observer standard is a crucial safeguard to preserve the fairness of trials in 
Washington State.  
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